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for approval by the Board of Directors.Age, Education, and Occupational Earnings Inequality
The presence of a wide dispersion of earnings within narrowly
defined Census occupations raises two important questions about
the determinants of earnings behavior. First, what factors are
operative that cause individuals in the same occupation to be rewarded
differently? Second, do there exist systematic differences in these
determinants between occupations or groups of occupations? A response
to the second will have to await empirical investigation. In response
to the first, six explanations may be offered as hypotheses:
(1) Differences in tasks. A given Census occupation may represent
a variety of tasks and functions. A tisecretaryn, for example, may engage
in typing, shorthand and dictation work, reception work, administrative
chores, budgeting, or some combination of these. A "lawyer" may work
on corporate tax returns, wills, estates, contracts or litigation.
Tasks within an occupation usually vary in difficulty, and the more
difficult are usually accorded higher compensation because of the addi-
tional training required or because of the limited supply of qualified
personnel. Differences in schooling or ability, insofar as they are
related to the tasks performed, may thus lead to differences in pay
within an occupation.
(2) Different levels of efficiency. Workers in the same occu-
pation may perform the same task at different speeds or levels of
efficiency: Typists, prograimners and many kinds of operatives differ
in the speed and accuracy of their work. Differences in experience and
ability, insofar as they reflect the efficiency and reliability of—2—
theworkperformed,may result in differences in earnings within an
occupation.
(3) Institutional factors. Institutions will often set up dif-
ferential pay scales for a given occupation on the basis of education and
experience. Public school systems,branchesof the civil service,
and largecorporations have set pay scales based on education or years
of service for many lines of work.Theformulas used mayreflect
worker productivity or, as Ruggles (1970) argues,they may reflect
culturaland institutional systems of remuneration quitecontrary to
actual productivity. For whichever reason, earnings may vary directly
with age or education within an occupation.
(4) Time worked. Differences in hours worked per week and employ-
ment stability over the yearwill lead to differences in annualearnings.
(5) The demand for labor. Labor market conditions will often
vary from one locality to another, depending on the availability of
labor and the industrial mix of the regions. Differences in the demand
and supply conditions between areas will cause differences in compen-
sation for similar work.
(6) Discrimination. The differential compensation of workers
with similar ability, qualifications, and work experience on the basis
of their sex or race will lead to a dispersion of earnings within an
occupation.
In this paper, we will investigate the effect of these factors
on occupational earnings inequality across all occupations in our sample
and across occupations in five major Census subgroups. Age and
schooling will receive primary attention in our work and it will be—3—
shown that they are important determinants of earnings inequality among
professional and clerical occupations but not among skilled, semi—skilled
or unskilled occupations. Ability is also hypothesized as an important
factor, but no measure of ability is provided in our sample. Differences
in time worked and labor demand conditions, as measured by industrial and
urban—rural mix, will also be analyzed, and their effect on earnings
inequality is strong in most of the occupational subsamples. Differences
inthe race andsex composition of occupations do not appear to be
significantfactors in occupational earnings inequality, and the
explanation offered is that discrimination takes the form of occupational
segregationrather than differences in pay for similar work. In the
conclusion a sketch of a "structural" theory of income distribution is
proposed to account for our results.
I. Empirical Results and Interpretation
To analyze the determinants of occupational earnings inequality,
we randomly drew a sample of approximately 200 workers for each of 291
occupations in 1960 and 439 in 1970 from the 1960 and 1970 Census 1/100
Public Use Samples.' We then computed the mean and standard deviation
of earnings, age, schooling and hours worked, an industrial dispersion
coefficient, and the percent urban, white male, white female, black
male, and black female for each occupation. For the purpose of regres-
sion analysis, the observational unitwasthe occupation, and regressions
11n the 1960 Census there were 295 occupations. Four, however,
had fewer than 50 occupational members and were omitted. Many occupa-
tions in the two years had less than 200 members but more than 50 and
were kept in the sample. The total sample size was 41,349 in 1960 and
63,661 in 1970.—4—
were performed across all occupations and across occupations in
each of five major sub—groups ——professional,technical, and
managerial (professional); clerical andsales(clerical); skilled
and craft (skilled); semi—skilled and operative (operative); and
serviceandunskilled (service)
A.The Level of Occupational Earnings Inequality
We chose the coefficient of variation of earnings, defined as
theratio of the standard deviation of earnings to mean earnings
(SD(E)/i), as our measure of earnings inequality, since mean earnings
varied considerably between occupations and for a given occupation
between 1960 and 1970. The coefficient of variation for all those
earning wage and salary income in the economy was .953in 1960
and.952 in 1970 (See Wolff (j975))•3 The average (unweighted)
occupational coefficient of variation across all occupations was
.683 in 1960 and .707 in 1970, lower than the overall level of
inequality in the two years (Table 1). The slight rise in the
average level of occupational inequality, despite the finer occupational
classification scheme in 1970, suggests that the presence of occupational
2The Public Use Sample Occupational Codes for the five major
sub—groups are as follows:
1960 1970




Service 801—985 740—796, 821—986
3Earningsreported in the 1960and 1970 Censuses refer to years
1959and 1969, respectively. All other variables, unless otherwise
indicated, are as of the time the Census questionnaire was answered.—5—
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coefficient of variation; 5) H total
year times average hours per week);
years; 8) C ="industrialdispersion
defined as
16 2
C1 — Ef1(!1 —E)
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where f1 is the fraction of occupation i employed in industrial group j for each
of the 16 major Census industrial groupings, is the mean earnings of occupation
.
iinindustrial group j, and E is the mean earnings of occupation i; 9) ¼ SMSA
percent of occupation employed in an SMSA (Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area);
10) Whitesnon—Spanish whites, Chinese, Japanese; 11) BlacksBlacks, Spanish
whites, and others.
Data Sources: Stratified samples drawn from the 1960 and 1970 Census 1/100
Public Use Samples.

















Fraction of Labor Force
1) Bar()= samplemean; 2)
3) B —wageand salary earnings; 4) SD(E)
hours worked per year (average weeks per
6) A —agein years; 7) S —schoolingin
coefficient" of occupational employment,
.683 .715 .769 .495 .606 .880
4428
•6148 3570 4727 3513 2110
1824 1961 1710 1874 1783 1604
639 646 646 527 625 785
39.2 39.4 36.8 41.7 36.9 40.1
12.8 12.3 13.4 12.8 11.4 15.1
11.6 14.6 11.9 9.9 9.8 9.4
2.37 2.17 2.17 2.52 2.42 2.71
453 574 439 411 355 377
616 782 623 585 471 469
55.0 58.6 58.6 57.1 50.5 46.6
69.7 74.5 51.3 87.7 72.5 47.2
20.8 21.8 42.7 5.0 17.2 25.8
6.7 2.6 4.3 6.9 8.0 16.1
2.8 1.2 1.7 0 2.3 10.9
291 97 37 59 53 45
1.00 .213 .254 .120 .195 .218—6—
Table 1 (continued)




: 1) Bar flsamplemean; 2) SDsample standard deviation;
3) Ewage andsalaryearnings; 4) SD(E)/! —coefficientof variation; 5) U —total
hours worked per year (average weeks per year times average hours per week);
6) A —agein years; 7) S —schoolingin years; 8) C "industrial dispersion
coefficient" of occupational employment, defined as
C —f(1
—1)2
where is the fraction of occupation i employed in industrial group j for each
of the 16 major Census industrial groupings, is the mean earnings of occupation
I in industrial group j, and is the mean earnings of occupation i; 9) % SMSA
percent of occupation employed in an SMSA (Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area);
10) Whites =non—Spanishwhites, Chinese, Japanese; 11) BlacksBlacks, Spanish
whites, and others.
Data Sources: Stratified samples drawn from the 1960 and 1970 Census 1/100
Public Use Samples.
Variables AllProfessional Service
SD(E)IE •707 .696 .794 .560 .647 .934
1 6816 9597 5403 6802 5287 3259
if 1821 1913 1694 1921 1859 1538
SD(H) 635 643 656 558 603 739
A 38.4 39.4 37.1 37.8 39.1 37.4
SD(A) 13.6 12.8 144 12.7 14.2 15.3
S 12.3 14.9 12.3 10.9 10.2 10.5
SD(S) 2.25 2.11 1.99 2.22 2.49 2.64
(?1) 471 584 458 410 397 387
C 1060 1356 1125 988 785 697
% SMSA 50.0 56.9 57.1 54.5 44.1 26.1
Z White male 63.6 69.4 42.0 84.1 58.7 45.0
•
X White female 25.2 25.1 49.0 6.6 24.7 31.4
% Black male 7.0 3.1 4.1 8.4 11.7 12.0
% Black female 4.1 2.3 4.9 1.9 5.0 11.6
Number of Occupations 439 151 61 96 66 65
Fraction of Labor Force1.00 .212 .259 .117 .170 .242
.—7—
inequality is not a classification artifact but a substantive phenomenon.
On the other hand, when the coefficient of variation was regressed
on the occupational size (in millions of workers) across all occupations,
4
occupational size had a positive and significant coefficient.This
suggests that occupations with larger populations are characterized
by more tasks and functions and that a finer occupational breakdown
may reduce the measured level of inequality.
The mean coefficient of variation varied considerably between
occupational groups. In 1960 it was highest among service occupations,
followed by clerical, professional, operative and skilled occupations.
Between 1960 and 1970 the average degree of inequality rose in all
groups, except professionals. However, the rank order among the five
groups was identical in 1970 to that of 1960, suggesting the same set
of factors at work in the two years within each of the five groups.
B.
On a priori grounds we would expect the impact of age on earnings
to vary considerably from occupation to occupation. For those whose




Occupational Size .064 .065
(2.6) (2.3)
5Mincer (1974) shows quite convincingly that individual experience
is a better predictor of an individual's earnings than his age. In
our sample, where the unit of observation is the occupation, there is
little quantitative difference between using age and experience. (The
correlation between mean age and mean experience, estimated as age less
years of schooling less five, across occupations was .93 in both 1960
and 1970.) Moreover, the use of the standard estimate for experience
Is known to be poor for females and minorities, who are included in our
sample, and the use of experience rather than age raises the question
of whether total work experience or experience in a particular occupation
is more relevant for occupational earnings.—8—
experience leads to on—the—job training and either increased eff 1—
ciency at a given task (typing, for example) or the assumption of more
difficult tasks (engineering, for example), we would anticipate a rise
in the pay rate with age. Among other occupational groups like
civil servants, school teachers and unionized crafts, where wage
scales are apportioned. to age for institutional reasons, we would
anticipatea similar cross—sectional profile. Among semi—skilled
and unskilled occupations, like taxi drivers and maids, where experience
leads to little increase in productivity, we would expect little
bearing of age on earnings. Previous cross—sectional evidence tends
to confirm this pattern:(Wolff (1975), pp. 21—22 and 60—61). Within
most professional and clerical occupations earnings rise with age
until about age 60 and then level off. Within most skilled, semi-
skilled and unskilled occupations, earnings rise until about age 30,
level off, and then decline. For the labor force as a whole, the hourly
wage rate rises steeply with age until about age 27, then rises less
steeply, and finally levels offatabout age 40. These results conform
with common observation. For many professional groups, like
programmers, air pilots, and college professors, administrative posi-
tions, particularly in public administration, and clerical jobs,
like secretaries, salaries will start low, increase rapidly in the
early years, then rise less rapidly, and, in many instances, level
off as institutionally—Imposed ceilings are reached. For occupational
groups, like garage attendants, bartenders, and janitors, earnings
will show little systematic relation to age.
Moreover, the previous results suggest that the age—earnings
cross—sectional profile is approximately logarithmic in shape for the—9—
pooled labor force and for professional and clerical occupations and
flatfor skilled, semi—skilled and service groups. In the former case,
an increase in mean age, with the age distribution around the mean
constant,will resultinhigher mean earnings, a lover variance of
earnings, and thus a lower coefficient of variation.6Inthe latter
case, a higher mean age will have no effect on the coefficient of
variation. The regression results in Table 2 confirm this hypothesis.
The impact of the standard deviation of age on earnings inequality
is more difficult to predict a priori, since it depends on how the
shape of the age distribution shifts. If an increased standard
deviation of age reflects a greater concentration of younger workers,
then earnings inequality would rise, since mean earnings would fall
but the variance of earnings rise. Conversely, if it reflects a
greater concentration of older workers, inequality would fall, since
mean earnings would increase but the variance decline. In 1960
6Suppose in a given occupation, earningsE =k(in Ai) + c
for an individual i of age Ai. Mean earnings E and the variance of
earnings V(E) are thus given by
I Ein A1 + c andV(E) = EE (Ei —E)2
where' N is the occupational size. Suppose everyone in the occupation
agesby At. Then
—E+AE1E1+k-i
Meanearnings will therefore rise. Moreover,
E —E +kAt(1——1-) i j i j A1 A
If Ei > then IE
— <IE
—EI.




Therefore,the variance of earnings will fall.— 10—
Table2
ResultsofRegressing the Coefficient of Variation on
Indicated Variables Across Occupations (t—ratios in parentheses)
1960
Independent
Variables All Professional ClericalSkilledOperative Service
Constant 2.01* 2.78** 11.57 —.85 1.66 _4•35**
(3.8) (2.5) (6.9) (0.7) (0.9) (2.0)
E .0000089 .000018 —.000048 _.000034** .000055 —.000069
(.82) (1.3) (1.1) (2.0) (1.6) (1.4)
_.00040* —.00015 _.00073* _.00017* —.00033 _.00Ô29**
(8.3) (1.7) (5.1) (32) (1.9) (2.3)
SD(ll) .00089* .0013* —.00028.00049* .00068* .00088*
(10.4) (9.2) (1.0) (3.6) (3.1) (3.6)
_.041* _Q53** _.266* .026 —.015 .073
(3.5) (2.1) (5.2) (0.9) (0.3) (1.6)
SD(A) .0016 _.036** —.022 .0033 .0057 .025
(.24) (2.4) (1.1) (0.3) (0.3) (1.7)
S _.116* _.180** _.822* .152 —.097 .450**
(2.6) (2.2) (5.3) (1.3) (0.6) (2.4)
SD(S) .076** .067 .225** .034 —.036 .180
(2.5) (1.4) (2.3) (0.7) (0.4) (1.6)
(ri) .0032* .0039** .023* —.0029 .0017 —.0081
(2.9) (2.0) (5.0) (1.0) (0.4) (1.7)
C .000075* .000061** .00015 .000082**.00039* .00013**
(3.3) (2.2) (1.9) (2.1) (4.6) (2.0)
(%SNSA
—5)2 .012* .015* .013 .0034 .0084 .029*
(3.7) (2.8) (0.7) (0.9) (1.3) (4.1)
.606 .644 .912 .750 .670 .835
*Significantat the one percent level
**Significantat the five percent level
(Refer to Table 1 for symbol definition8.)— 11—
Table2 (continued)
Results of Regressing the Coefficient of Variation on
Indicated Variables Across Occupations (t—ratios in parentheses)
1970
Independent
Variables AllProfessionalClerical SkilledOperative Service
Constant 2.30* 3.87* 8.27* 1.41 2.24 1.17
(4.7) (3.7) (4.7) (1.3) (0.5) (0.9)
—.000016 .000017**.000033 —.000011 .000012 _.000104*
(0.2) (2.4) (1.1) (1.0) (0.3) (4.6)
II _.00040* _.00025* _.00058* _.00031*.0010* —.00003
(9.2) (3.7) (3.1) (4.9) (3.7) (0.3)
SD(}l) .00040* .00097* .00092*.00044* —.00046 —.00003
(5.4) (9.4) (3.7) (4.2) (1.5) (0.2)
A _.045* _.078* _.198* —.032 —.010 —.003
(3.9) (3.2) (3.5) (1.3) (0.0) (0.1)
SD(A) .018* .021** .028 .015* .020 —.011
(3.3) (2.0) (1.7) (2.7) (0.6) (1.1)
S _.l24* _.264* _.657* —.057 .037 .009
(3.1) (3.7) (4.0) (.64) (0.1) (1.1)
SD(S) .089* .037 .104 .084** .109 .l29**
(3.5) (1.1) (1.1) (2.2) (0.8) (2.0)
(SA) .0035* .0053* .016* .0024 —.00031 —.00010
(3.4) (3.0) (3.4) (1.1) (0.0) (0.0)
C .000040* .000025**.000042 .000027 .000087 —.000043
(3.7) (2.0) (1.7) (1.4) (1.3) (1.0)
(% SNSA —•5)2.016* .022* .044* .0058** .0176 .0101
(6.2) (4.3) (4.9) (2.2) (1.9) (1.8)
.534 .619 .826 .773 .502 .674
*Significantat the one percent level
**Significantat the five percent level— 12—
theonly significant àoefficieat of the standard deviation of age
at the five percent significance level was in the professional
group, but it was negative. In 1970 the coefficients in the pooled,
professional, and skilled samples were positive and significant at,
at least, the five percent level andthecoefficient in the clerical
subsample was positive and significant at the ten percent level.
This difference in results between 1960 and 1970 can be attributed
to the change in the age composition of the work force during this
period. Between 1960 and 1970, the median age of those employed fell
from 41 to 39, the percentage of workers 21 or under increased from
16 to 20, and the percentage of workers 26 or under from 25 to 30 (see
Wolff (1975), p. 27). In the professional and clerical groups the
mean age was stable but the standard deviation of age increased and
in the skilled group mean age fell sharply while the standard deviation
of age remained constant, suggesting that in each of these groups
there was a higher concentration of new entrants in 1970 than in
1960 (Table 1). Given the change in the age composition of the
work force, the stronger positive effect of the standard deviation of
age on earnings inequality in 1970 than in 1960 would serve to
confirm the hypothesized cross—sectional age profiles for the occu-
pational groups.
C. Schooling
Previous work suggests a wide variation in education—earnings
profiles among occupations (Wolff (1977)). For professions like
lawyers, doctors, and university teachers, where an advanced degree
is required, there is almost no variance in schooling and thus little— 13—
relationof earnings to education within the occupation. Among other
professions like school teachers, nurses and engineers, schooling
generally varies from two to eight years of college, and earnings
generally rise with schooling in this range. Among many clerical
occupations, education varies from two years of high school to four
years of college and earnings tend to rise with education. Among
skilled occupations there is a wide variance of educational attainment,
and earnings tend to rise with schooling through the high school
years and then level off. For operatives and service workers, for
whom relatively little training is required, there is a wide range
of schooling levels but little relation of earnings to schooling.
Additional evidence suggests that among many professional, most
clerical, and some skilled occupations, earnings rise with schooling
after some minimal level of education, though less slowly as advanced
education becomes increasingly less relevant to the actual tasks
performed, and usually up to a ceiling (Wolff (1975), Pp. 53—56).
Thus, we would expect logarithmic education—earnings cross—sectional
profiles within the professional, clerical and perhaps skilled
occupational groups, and flat profiles within the operative and
service groups.
The regression coefficients of mean schooling (S) confirm this
hypothesis at the five percent significance level for professionals
in 1960 and at the one percent level for professionals in 1970 and
clerical workers in both years. Moreover, the coefficient of mean
schooling is negative and significant at the five percent level in
1960 and at the one percent level in 1970 for the pooled sample.
The other coefficients of mean schooling are insignificant, except—14 —
forservice workers in 1960, where it is positive. The effect of the
standard deviation of schooling on earnings inequality is more diff i—
cult to predict, since, as in the case of the standard deviation of age,
it depends on the other moments of the education distribution. The
coefficient of the standard deviation of schooling was positive and
significant at, at least, the five percent significance level for the
pooled sample in both years, clerical workers in 1960, and skilled
and service workers in 1970.
Between 1960 and 1970 the educational composition of the work
force changed substantially. The percentage with 8 or less years
of schooling fell from 33 to 22; the percentage with a high school
degree or more rose from 51 to 55; and those who attended college from
17 to 23 (Wolff (1975), pp. 21—22). However, the distribution of the
labor force among the five occupational groups was almost constant
in this period, except for a shift between operatives and service
workers (Table 1). As a result, the more educated "filtered down"
the occupational ladder. The mean education among professionals
increased slightly between 1960 and 1970, that of clerical workers
and operatives somewhat more, and that of skilled and service workers
by about a full year. To determine whether the effect of schooling
on mean hourly earnings had altered over this period, we tried two
additional regression forms across the pooled sample and the subsamples:
(1) 4- a0




b0+ b1 in(S) + b2 ln( + b3 + v— 15—
Thecoefficient estimates of mean schooling and the logarithm of mean
schooling were significant at, at least, the five percent level for
the pooled, professional and clerical samples in 1960, insignificant
for the skilled, operative, and service groups in 1960, and significant
for all groups in 1970 (Table 3). These results suggest that as
job opportunities closed out for the more highly educated new entrants
in the professional and clerical field, they filtered down to the
higher—paying occupations in the skilled, operative and service groups.
This would explain the significant correlation of mean schooling and
mean hourly earnings in these groups in 1970 and its absence inl960.
However, this is a relation across occupations. Within skilled,
operative, and service occupations there Is as little relation between
education and earnings in 1970 as there was in 1960.
D. The Interaction of Age and Schooling
For professional and clerical workers, we would expect a positive
relation between earnings inequality and the age—education Interactive
variable, whereas for the other groups no relation. In fields like
engineering, programming, administration and secretarial work, entry
salaries tend to be fixed primarily by schooling level. The variance
In earnings will thus be low for a young cohort. As the cohort ages,
the importance of formal schooling for job performance lessens and
that of experience increases, and earnings spread out as factors like
7The 1970 coefficient estimates of mean schooling and the logarithm
of mean schooling in these three groups are approximately half of
what they are in the other groups, suggesting a much weaker relation
between schooling and earnings in these groups as opposed to the
professional and clerical groups.— 16—
Table3
Results of Regressing Hourly Earnings on Schooling,
Controlled for Age and Hours Worked*
(Coefficients a1 and b1 and their t—ratios shown)
All Professional Clerical Skilled Operative Service
1960
Form (i) .211 .227 .269 .123 .110 .044
(13.2) (5.8) (2.7) (1.6) (1.3) (0.7)
Form (ii) 2.53 3.10 3.04 1.49 0.95 0.37
(12.9) (5.8) (2.5) (1.9) (1.1) (0.6)
1970
Form (i) .448 .472 .469 .255 .262 .234
(24.4) (9.1) (4.4) (3.0). (2.8) (3.1)
Form (ii) 5.62 6.77 5.68 2.82 2.71 2.43
(23.4) (9.0) (4.1) (3.1) (2.9) (3.1)
*Seetext for equations (i) and (ii).
.— 17—
ability,drive, and the occurrence of opportunities assert themselves.
The positive impact of the interaction variable on earnings inequality




With a fixed hourly wage rate and a fixed distribution of hours
worked around the mean, an increase in mean hours worked will
cause an increase in mean earnings and a decline in the coefficient of
variation. With the hourly wage rate and mean hours worked fixed,
an increase in the standard deviation of hours worked will result
inincreased earnings inequality. This is confirmed for the pooled
sample and most of the occupational subsamples (Table 2)8
8Thevariable used was total hours worked per year (H), which
was computed as the product of weeks worked in the year preceding
the Census year and the hours worked in a prespecified week in the
Census year. Only those with a positive number of weeks and hours
worked were included in calculating the mean and standard deviation
of hours worked.
Results from regression forms (1) and (ii) (see Section C)
indicated that the hourly wage rate was positively and significantly
related to hours worked in the pooled and all subsamples, except for
professionals in both years and clerical workers in 1960. This may
reflect overtime payments, the lower compensation of part—time and
marginal employees and the like. This finding is, in fact, what Barzel
(1973) predicts. Mincer's (1974, p. 94) results also suggest a
positive correlation between weekly earnings and weeks worked, after
controlling for schooling and experience. Mincer (1975) later argues
that firms which train employees are more reluctant to lay them off
and employees are more reluctant to switch jobs because their marginal
product would be lower elsewhere. This, plus more efficient search
procedures, would account for the smaller unemployment of those with
the higher wage rates. This issue deserves fuller exploration at
a later time. For our present purposes, the hourly wage rate gradient
with respect to hours worked does not appear sufficiently great to
offset the postulated effect of the mean and standard deviation of
total hours on earnings inequality.— 18—
2.Alternative Employment Opportunities
To control for the industrial mixofan occupation, wà introduced
the following "industrial dispersion coefficient" C:
— f(JJ —1)2
for occupation I across industries j, where E is the mean earnings
of occupation i In industry j, E the mean earnings of occupation i,
and f Is the percentage of occupation I employed in industry This
index Is higher the larger the dispersion of occupational membership
across industries and the larger the difference In mean earnings
across Industries. It roughly measures the availability of alternative
employment opportunities for an occupation in different industries
and tends to reflect differences In tasks between industries. (For
example, a bank economist might forecast interest rates, while a
government economist might design national account estinating proce-
dures.) We would expect the dispersion index to have a positive
Impact on earnings inequality. In 1960 this relation is confirmed
in five of the six cases at, at least, the five percent level and
in the sixth case at the ten percent level. In 1960, it is confirmed
at, at least, the five percent level in two cases and at the ten
percent level in one.
9The 16 industrial groups used in the index are as follows:
1) AgrIculture, Forestry, and Fisheries; 2) MinIng; 3) Construction;
4) Manufacturing (durables); 5) Manufacturing (nondurabls9); 6) Trans-
portation; 7) Communication; 8) Utilities and Sanitary Services;
9) Wholesale Trade; 10) Retail Trade; 11) Finance, Insurance, and
Real Estate; 12) Business and Repair Services; 13) Personal. Services;
14) Entertainment and Recreation Services, 15) Professional and Related
Services; and 16) Public Administration.— 19—
Tocontrol for the geographical spread of an occupation's employ-
ment, we introduced into the regression the square of the difference
between the percentage of an occupation employed in an SMSA and
50percent)0 Previous work hadindicatedthatmeanannual earnings
were almost uniformly higher for workers employed in SMSA's than those
employed outside them in a given occupation (Wolff (1975), p. 50).
Moreover, in running the following regression:
(iii) —p-—
c0+ c1 + c2K + c3 + c4(ZSMSA) + w
R
we obtained a positive and significant coefficient at, at least, the
five percent level, in the pooled samples and all subsamples in both
years, except for clerical workers in both years andoperativesin
1960. The previous work hadalsosuggested that the variance of
earnings was approximately the same for SMSA workers and non—SMSA
workers in most occupations (Wolff (1975), p. 50). The overall variance
of earnings is therefore maximized when there is an even split in
the occupational work force between SNSA and non—SMSA employment.
Mean earnings, on the other hand, rise as the percentage employed in
SMSA's Increases. Thus, the coefficient of variation either declines
as the percentage employed in an SMSA increases or rises as the SMSA
percentage increases from zero, peaks at or before fifty percent,
and then declines. The percent SMSA less fifty percent should there-
fore have a negative coefficient. The results for 1960 show significant
and positive coefficients for the pooled, professional, and service
-10SMSAstandsf or Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area which
includes not only the central city area but also the "ring."— 20—
samplesat the one percent level, and those for 1970 show three
coefficients positive and significant at the one percent level, one
at the five percent level, and the other two at the ten percent
ievei)
One- possible explanation for this somewhat paradoxical result
is that the urban—rural mix of an occupation is a relatively invariant
characteristic of that occupation. Except for services, the percentage
employed in SNSA's remained relatively stable in the occupational
subsamplesbetween 1960and 1970 (Table 1). Previous results had
shovedthiseven more strongly (Wolff (1975), p. 50). Thus, what our
results indicate is not that shifts in the urban—rural mix lead to
greater or less inequality within an ocupation but rather that between
occupations more mixed occupations have less inequality than less
mixed ones. This latter possibility might be due to greater competitive
forcesin themixed occupations and a greater tendency to wage rate
equalizationfor similarly qualified workers. This hypothesis warrants
furtherinvestigation in thefuture.
Another interestingfeatureof the results is that, except for
services, all the coefficients of the deviation form of the percentSMSA
variable were more significant in1970 than in 1960.12 On theother hand,
11Wealsotried the percent employed inan SMSA instead of the
deviation form of the percent employed in the regression with far
fewer significant coefficients. Farbman (1973), whose unit of observa-
tion was the county and whose sample consisted of southern states,
found relatively few significant coefficients for percent rural.
12The rise in the minimum wage during the sixties and the extension
of its coverage to many kinds of service workers may have narrowed
the earnings differential between urban and rural areas for service
workers and accounted for the lower t—ratio of the variable for service
workers in 1970.—21—
all the regression coefficients of the industrial dispersion coeffi-
cient were less significant in 1970 than in 1960, except for the pooled
sample. This suggests a trend towards reducing occupational earnings
differences across industries while increasing them between rural
and urban areas. This too might warrant further analysis in the future.
3. Expected Earnings
To determine whether a trade—off existed between expected earnings
and its risk, as measured by the coefficient of variation, we included
mean earnings (E) in the regression. The only case of a significant
and positive coefficient was for professionals in 1970, suggesting
that this group has a choice between a low risk, low return job, like
teaching, and a high risk, high return job, like administration.13
4.Discrimination
Having controlledfor time worked, age, schooling, industrial
dispersion,and geographical mix,wewanted to determine whether there
existedany systematic tendency to underpay females and minorities
with respect to white males within a given occupation. In the case
of minorities, which constitute a small percentage of most occupations,
the effect should show up as a positive relation between the coeffi-
cient of variation and the percentage of minorities employed in the
occupation. In the case of females, where they constitute approxi-
mately one—third or more of an occupation, this should show up as a
negative relation between earnings inequality and the square of the
skilled workers in 1960 and service workers in 1970 had
significant negative coefficients. This suggests that the high wage
earners in these groups also enjoy the steadier employment. In the
case of skilled workers, this may be due to the heavy presence of unions.— 22—
differencebetween percent femaleandfifty percent.
Different forms were tried for the pooled sample and each of the
sub samples in the two years. The results varied very littlebetween
forms, and Table 4 shows the results of addingthedeviation totm
of percent females andthepercent black andHispanicto the variables
in Table 2.14 The change in the R—squared from adding these two
variables was,relatively small in all cases except for operatives in
1960and service workers. The only occurrences of significant coeff i—
cients in the hypothesized directions were for the percent black and
Hispanic in the operative group in 1960 at the one percent level and
for the deviation form of percent females in 1970 in the pooled sample
at the five percent level and for the service group at the one percent
level. The coefficient estimates of the other variables changed
vey little from adding these twovariables.15 By and large no
systematicpattern of differential compensation for white males,
females,and minorities within occupation could be inferred from our
regression results.
L4other variables tried were the percent female, the percent
white female, the deviation form of the percent white female, the
deviation form of percent black and Hispanic, the percent black and
Hispanic males,the percent black and Hispanic females, and the
deviationforms of the latter two.
15The major exceptions were the following: 1) the standard
deviationofschooling became insignificant for clerical workers in
1960; 2) mean earnings became insignficant for
3) mean age, the standard deviation of age and the age—education inter-
active variable became significant, at. the five percent level, for
service workers in 1960; and 4) the standard deviation of schooling
became insignificant for service workers in 1970.— 23—
Table4
The Change in the R—Squared Statistic Resulting from
the Inclusion of Percent Black and Hispanic and the Square
of the Difference Between Percent Female and Fifty Percent








These results conform to those reported in an earlier study
(Wolf f (1976)). In this study the work force was divided into 32
occupational groups, and the overall differential in earnings between
whites, and blacks and Hispanics, and males and females was decomposed
into two effects: one from differences in their occupational distri-
bution and the other from differences in mean earnings within occupation.
In the case of blacks and Hispanics, "occupational segregation" was
the more Important factor of the two, while in the case of females
both factors were of similar import)6 However, no adjustments were
made for hours worked, age, education, or differences in labor demand
conditions, as in the present study. Moreover, here we use a much
16Even with a division of the labor force into five occupational
groups, we can see sizeable differences in the occupational distri-
bution of white males, white females, black and Hispanic males, and
black and Hispanic females (Table 1).— 24—
fineroccupation breakdown. Therefore, in our sample occupational
segregation should showupas a much stronger determinant of differences
in earnings between white malesandother groups, and differences
in pay for the same work a much weaker force, as the results in Table 4
tend to support.
This argument would also help explain the findings of Chiswick (1974)
of a flatter age—earnings profile for non—white males than white
males, of Hanushek (1973) thatthemean regression coefficient of
experiencefor blacks was about halfthat of whites, and of Hanushek (1973)
and of others of a smaller rate of return to schooling for blacks
than whites. These results would occur if discrimination forced
blacks into those occupations where schooling and experience were un-
related to earnings, which are precisely the low—paid occupations.
Chiswickarguedthat the flatter age—earnings profile of non-whites
was probably due to their smaller post—school investment. Yet their
smaller"investment" may be due to their placament in those occupations
where training is irrelevant. Welch (1973) found that the returns to
schoolingfor those entering the work force in 1960 were greater for
blacks (compared to other blacks) than for whites (compared to other
whites), while for those entering the work force in the 1930's and
1940's the returns were less for blacks (and in some cases negative).
This would be the case if the more educated blacks in the younger
cohorts now have access to the upper part of the occupational ladder
while the less educated are forced into their "traditional" slots
at the bottom of the occupational ladder. This hypothesis might
warrant further investigation in the future.— 27-
II.Conclusion and Comparison with Other Studies
One way of summarizing our findings is to look at the percent
of the inter-occupation variance in earnings inequality explained by
the factors we have used in our model (Table 2). The coefficients
of determination (R2) vary between .50 and .91. The explained variance
is highest for the clerical group in both years, followed by skilled
and service workers, and then by professionals and operatives. If the
residual is primarily due to the structured and institutional charac-
teristics of the occupation, then these characteristics se strongest
for professionals and Operatives and weakest for clerical workers.
Between 1960 and 1970, the R2 declined in each group, except skilled
workers, suggesting that institutional forces became more important during
the decade.
The "human capital" factors, schooling and age, were strongly
significant for the professional. and clerical groups, marginally
significant for skilled labor, and almost entirely insignificant for
operatives and service workers. This suggests that human capital
factors may be relevant to perhaps half the labor force. The fact
that the human capital factors are highly significant for the pooled
samples must be construed as an artifact of aggregation, where the
significant relations between earnings, schooling and age in the pro-
fessional and clerical groups dominate the random relations in the
other groups. Moreover, the fact that Mincer (1974) and Chiswick
(1974) obtain significant coefficients for schooling and experience
across the entire labor force is likewise due to the aggregation of— 26—
relevantwith non—relevant groups.17
An alternative explanation for our results to one that might be
inferred from a humancapitalmodel is thatthedistribution of earnings
slots is fairly well fixed within occupation and that the occupational
distribution (and by implication the industrial composition) is the
primary determinant of the overall distribution of earnings. This
interpretation is consistent with Soltow's (1960) early findings that
historically the change in income inequality in the United States was
due more to the redistribution of workers over occupations than their
distribution over schooling level or age. It is also consistent with
Hanushek's (1973) finding that differences in industrial and occupa-
tional structure among regions account for over 80 percent of the
variance in mean earnings across regions and to Osberg's (1975)
finding that once controlling for differences in structure between
counties, personal characteristics like age and education are unimpor-
tant in explaining differences in mean earnings and earnings inequality
across counties.
The function of schooling would then be to "rank" individuals
within a relatively well defined set of occupational slots. This is
consistent with our finding that the secular change in the schooling
distribution between 1960 and 1970 had relatively little impact on
occupational earnings inequality. What appeared to happen instead
was that the better educated new entrants in the labor force"filtered
down" the occupational ladder as professional and clerical positions
.
17Actually,their samples are restricted to males between 25 and
65, to white males between 25 and 65 in some cases, and white non—farm
adult males in other cases.—27—
closed up to the higher paying occupations within the skilled,
operative, and service groups. This would explain the significant
relation between mean earnings and mean education across occupations
in these latter three groups in 1970 and their insignificant relation
in 1960. However, the more highly educated new entrants in these
occupations apparently did not receive greater wages than their less
educated co—workers, since the increased mean schooling in these groups
still had an insignificant impact on earnings inequality. It appears
instead that the educational requirement for a given job in these
occupational groups was inflated during the 1960's to meet the composi-
tion of the new labor force, but the tasks remained relatively unchanged
and pay remained commensurate with the task.'8 Thus, it does not appear
that, given a structure of occupational tasks, education is intrinsically
productivity—augmenting. Rather, it appears to serve as a ranking
device for prospective employees throughout much of the occupational
ladder.
The effectofexperience on earnings would also vary among occu-
pations, depending on the characteristics of the occupation. For
professional, clerical, and some skilled occupations Mincer's (1962,
1974, 1975) argument that differences in post—school investment in
training leads to differences in earnings is consistent with our
findings. Moreover, special studies of professional groups by Link
(1973) for chemical engineers, Katz (1973) for university faculty,
LSprom our personal experience we know that in a public utility
company in New Jersey an appliance repairman did not require a high
school diploma in 1965 but he did in 1970, though the job changed very
little over this period.— 28—
Johnsonand Stafford (1974) for academic economists, and IClevmarken
and Quigley (1976) forSwedishengineers all show a positive relation
between earnings and experience. However, for operative, service
and certain skilled occupations age (and by implication experience)
seems to have little bearing on earnings.
Our finding that earnings inequality decreases with mean age within
an occupation is not inconsistent with Chiswick's (1974) finding that
the variance of age is positively related to earnings inequality
across states, to Mincer's that the relative dispersion in gross
earnings rises as a schooling cohort ages until peak earnings are
reached, or to a previous finding that the Cmi coefficient fell for
age cohorts between 18 and 30 and rose thereafter (Wolff (1975)).
These findings can be reconciled if the occupational composition shifts
as a cohort ages and, in particular, if the more able, more ambitious
or better schooled move up the job ladder to the more technical or
administrative positions while the less able, less ambitious, or
less schooled remain "stuck"intheir entry—level occupations. This
is consistent with the findings of both Rause (1972) and Taubman and
Wales (1973) of increasing impact of ability on earnings with age.
This interpretation is similar to one offered by Becker (1975, p. 217)
to explain the earlier peak. of earnings with age for less skilled than
more skilled workers. This interpretation is also consistent with
Alexander's (1974) finding that firmexperienceis a more Important
determinant of earningsthanage for low and medium income workers,
but a less important one for high income workers. This would be the
case if the high income workers can move up the occupational ladder
faster by switching firms, whereas the low and medium income workers,— 29—
asAlexander argues, start at the bottom of the ladder when they
switch firms.
The attenuation of the impact of schooling on earnings with age,
observed by us, Chiawick (1974), and Mincer (1974), can also be
explained by this model. Suppose that entry into occupations in the
top part of the ladder is set by schooling level and that in the bottom
part is relatively free and that entry—level wages are relatively
fixed in an occupation. As the cohort ages, promotions and raises
will be based on performance, and the more able, better educated
and more ambitious will obtain better positions and receive higher
earnings. (See Taubman and Wales (1973) for a similar argument.)
However, since post—school training and ability play a more Important
role in the later working life, the effect of schooling on earnings
will decay over time. This model can help explain Mincer's (1974)
findings that earnings inequality is less for the highly educated than
the less educated early In working life, but the order is reversed
later in working life, results which Mincer says "are in no obvious
way related to secular trends in human capital, such as the upward
trend in schooling" (pp. 108—9). At the entry level stages, the highly
educated are more concentrated in the occupational ladder than the less
educated and thus have a amaller relative dispersion of earnings.
As the cohort ages, the less educated remain in their initial occupa-
tions and, relatively speaking, their earnings tend to converge.
Among the more educated there will be greater opportunity for some
tomove up the occupational ladder and the earnings within this
group will tend to diverge with age.— 30—
Thealternative argument we have presented is, at thisstage,
simply a sketch of a model in which the function of schooling and
experience canbeunderstood in the context of an exogenously
determined occupational structure. We hope this work will lead to
further development of the argument by ourselves and other researchers.— 31—
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